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In an important essay entitled "Ethics and the Control of Retardates,"l B. F. Skinner has outlined some of his opinions about the
nature of ethical reflection and about policies which should determine
the treatment of retarded persons. It is good to see a policy-maker like
Skinner address himself to ethics, since it is clear that ethical principles play crucial roles in policy formation. 2 Yet, even though he
discusses ethics in his essay, like many self-styled, tough-minded
empiricists, Skinner believes that scientific facts, not moral reasoning,
determine how people behave.
Skinner says that ethics should be equated with feelings and moods
which are reflected in terms like "caring" or "moral outrage." He then
dismisses these feeliJlgs as largely ineffective. They are ineffective
because they are derivatives of the forces which truly shape human
conduct, namely contingencies of psychological reinforcement. When
he then sets forth his policies regarding the retarded, Skinner feels free
to set aside feelings or ethical opinions as relevant for the shaping of
human behavior. His thesis is that the design and manipulation of
psychological reinforcements are the only effective ways to control the
behavior of retarded humans.
In the light of my differences with certain of these opinions, and
my curiosity about the nature of Skinner's moral thought, I propose
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to accomplish three things in this essay: 1) to show that in spite of his
denials, Skinner operates with an unconscious, yet nevertheless clearly
identifiable set of ethical principles - sections one and two; 2) to
demonstrate that Skinner's ethics play a crucial role in his policy
formation - section three; and 3) to highlight several problems which
appear in B. F. Skinner's ethics generally and his policies concerning
retarded persons specifically - section four.

1. Skinner's Metaethics

Upon reading his essay on the treatment of the retarded, it is clear
that Skinner, rather than understanding himself as indulging in moral
reasoning, views himself as a psychologist-scientist who can explain
why humans engage in ethical thinking and in tum can explain how
ineffectual that thinking is. This is the case because Skinner reduces
ethical language to various kinds of reinforcements. The words "good"
and "bad, " the sense of duty, the feelings of obligations, approval,
anger, and so on, all reflect how human behavior "has been shaped
and maintained by earlier consequences" or reinforcements.3 Ethical
utterances are essentially verbal ejaculations which reflect conditioning reinforcers or adversive stimuli in the same way that feelings are
"by-products" of the reinforcements which shape behavior. In his
book Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner crisply put ethical judgments in their place: "To make a value judgment by calling something
good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects." 4 This
reduction of feeling and one of its verbal manifestations - ethical
language - to the status of a byproduct of environmental contingencies is also reflected in Skinner's statements about stealing and
mistreatment in his essay on the retarded.
B. F. Skinner's analysis of the sources of ethical language demonstrates that he regards himself as a noncognitivist. That is, Skinner
does not believe that humans truly and cognitively judge between
good and bad with active intellects capable of weighing dialectical
(good-bad) decisions. 5 His noncognitivism is rooted in his empiricism
and operant behaviorism in which all human behavior is regarded as
contingent upon material, environmental feedback. Throughout his
writings, he vigorously rejects any "pre-scientific" position which personifies the inner states and thoughts and feelings of humans. Personifications of human beings are "part of the armamentarium of autonomous man" whom, from the standpoint of operant behaviorism, Skinner purports to have vanquished. 6
Consistent with noncognitivism, Skinner insists that moral censorship is invalid. He claims that only environments and genes are bad,
not people. As he says, a "scientific analysis shifts the credit as well as
the blame to the environment."7
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Behind this moral neutrality lies Skinnerean determinism: humans
who have no autonomous freedom from their respective environments
cannot be blamed or credited for their actions.S Value judgments concerning people, including those who behave in any fashion toward
retarded persons, thus should be avoided. 9
Determinism and N oncognitivism
Skinner's determinism and its ethical partner, noncognitivism, serve
as fundamental tenets in his approach to criminals, the retarded, and
those who appear to be "insensitive" in their handling of the retarded.
His proposals for improving the care of any of these groups thus
center on manipulation of institutional environments, not the instilling of higher ethical values.
Although Skinner identifies himself with an ethical position which
must be designated noncognitivist, he vigorously distinguishes his position from that of noncognitivists like A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson.
Ayer and Stevenson were noncognitive emotivists who regarded ethical utterances as arising out of feeling. As "simply expressions of
emotion," these utterances have no authentic, truth-claiming validity,
claimed Ayer.10 Versus noncognitive emotivists, Skinner claims that
ethical sentences do not evince or express feelings. He argues that both
ethical utterances and feelings are derivations or byproducts of the
reinforcements affecting behavior. Two of the basic categories of these
reinforcements are 1) personal reinforcers, such as food, drink, and
sex, and 2) social reinforcers, by which humans are praised and
rewarded depending on whether their behavior is considered important by the group.
Because of his emphasis on social reinforcers, Skinner can hold - as
he does in his presentation on retardation - that ethical utterances are
not merely reflections of personal reinforcers. l l As part of the socially reinforcing context, ethical pronouncements may become reinforcers themselves. Ethical statements are nevertheless secondary or
weak reinforcers, both because they are derived from non-verbal reinforcements and because they merely reflect or are determined by past
influences from the environment.
In addition to noncognitivism, B. F. Skinner regards himself as a
relativist. He says, for example:
Each culture has its own set of goods, and what is good in one culture
may not be good in another. To recognize this is to take the position of
"cultural relativism ." What is good for the Trobriand Islander is good for
the Trobriand Islander, and that is .that. 12

Skinner is saying that "X is right" is equal in meaning to "X is a
reflection of the reinforcing contingencies of the speaker." Thus, even
as environmental reinforcements vary and change, so also what
humans call "good" and "bad" change. Presumably, two speakers representing two different sets of reinforcing environments may well have
May, 1978
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different meanings for the term " good" without either speaker's being
wrong. Each is using "good" with regard to his own relative set of
reinforcements.
By regarding nature - in this case natural reinforcements or contingencies - as subject to significant variation and change, this form of
nature-based metaethics offers a surprising twist to other nature-based
theories, all of which are forms of absolutism, not relativism. Nevertheless, Skinner's relativism is compatible with that of numerous social
scientists who regard ethical maxims and norms as relative to respective cultural and environmental conditions. 13
Skinner a N oncognitive Relativist

According to his own self-understanding, B. F. Skinner should be
identified as a noncognitive relativist. Yet, since noncognitivists hold
that humans do not make independent mental judgments or assertions
about that which is right and that which is wrong, we may well question whether the terms "relativist" or "absolutist" should be applied
to a noncognitivist metaethical position. In Skinner's case, however, a
relativist-absolutist distinction seems important because it highlights
his conviction that ethical statements are relative to reinforcers which
vary significantly, even though he regards these utterances as having
no independent cognitive validity. A noncognitive absolutist would
then presumably identify ethical utterances with a set of non-varying
causes.
To put the matter plainly, the problem with Skinner's ethical selfunderstanding is that he is neither a relativist nor a noncognitivist. His
essays and social proposals, for example, are saturated with implicit
absolutism. He does not regard the "good" about which he talks as
merely relative to some specific social group, and hence only applicable for that group or for himself and those whose environmental
reinforcements are exactly like his. Nor are Skinner's proposals set
forth merely for those who volunteer to live in communities like
Walden II, or for Americans alone, or even Westerners exclusively.
Skinner is in fact surrounded by a majority of intellectuals whose
definitions of human "well-being" include the notions of cognitive
freedom and individual autonomy. Yet, instead of saying that their
definitions of well-being are relatively correct because they reflect
dominant views and reinforcements of their society, Skinner calls their
thinking pre-scientific, fictional, endowed with "some fatal flaw," and
so forth.14
Skinner's ethical absolutism appears at numerous points in his writings. One example is evident in his chapter on "Punishment" in Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In this chapter Skinner sketches in ghastly
and powerful detail the horrors of torture and imprisonment. The
entire thrust of his essay is that such treatment is inherently wrong.
And he maintains that since punishment in somewhat milder forms is
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acceptable to the advocates of freedom and autonomy (if a person is
responsible for his wrong deeds, he should be punished), those advocates, even though they are in the majority, are wrong.15 A second
example of his absolutism appears in his essay on retarded persons. He
refuses to be satisfied either with the care which was or is commonly
accepted by society, or with the kind of care which would result from
treating the retarded according to the positive reinforcements which
normal, middle-class Americans find most satisfying. Retarded persons
should be given food and leisure and entertainment only in accord
with a set of absolute norms which Skinner believes are right and good
for all.
Implicit, yet definitive, in B. F. Skinner's metaethics is an ingenious, unique form of nature-based absolutism . Indeed, one of the
reasons why Skinner seems so willing and anxious to propose social
reforms is that he holds tenaciously to a form of ethical absolutism.
The definition of "good" that constantly and implicitly underlies
Skinner's reasoning is grounded in his understanding of the evolution of sensate life. He schematizes "good" into an ascending moral
order based on the ultimate norm that good is that which is in accord
with evolutionary progress. 16 His ascending order proceeds as follows:
in the first place, immediate or personal reinforcers are good. They are
good because evolution began and achieved significant force through
the ability of creatures to sort out what was personally reinforcing
from things (food, drink) and from one's fellow species (maternal
warmth, sex, and so on). All other reinforcers derive their power from
these. 17 On the basis of these reinforcers, animals became aware of
the consequences of their behavior in relation to their respective
environments, and this awareness or sensitivity is the dynamic key to
evolutionary progress. I8 Nevertheless, Skinner judges personal reinforcers as possessing limited goodness. Upon them alone evolution
would not have proceeded very far: no effective degree of behavior
emitted; 19 no powerful, complexly-organized cultures developed; no
status beyond savagery achieved.
In the second place, social or conditional reinforcers are better,
even though "they derive their power from personal reinforcers." 20
These are reinforcers which influence humans to act "for the good of
others," and include such factors as verbal reinforcements (praise, encouragement, moral utterances), ceremonies, and the actions of
humans within numerous social institutions - educational, religious,
political, economic. Although social reinforcers are less immediately
gratifying, they have become more powerful than many personal reinforcements among the human species. 21 Controlled by their social
environments, humans achieved extraordinary skill and power in the
evolutionary process. They have learned to accumulate and transmit
their learning and have moved to entirely new levels of self-management, security, health, and wisdom.
May, 1978
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Remote Consequences, Deferred Reinforcements
In the third place, sensitivity to remote consequences in hopes of
deferred reinforcements is best. This sensitivity is indebted to personal
and social reinforcements,22 but is not dependent on any current
reinforcers. It is perceived as important, Skinner argues, because the
most sensitive and successful creatures are more and more aware of
the consequences of their behavior, and they somehow realize or are
taught that their species could perish. Skinner seems aware that on the
basis of perceiving "good" in terms of reinforcements, humans hardly
have many reasons for regarding the survival of their culture as the
highest "good." 23 He refuses, of course, to base their concern for
survival value on factors like "feelings of loyalty," which for him are
only reflections of contingencies. Perhaps genetic factors are involved. 24 Some reinforcers do, after all, depend on significant time
lapses, such as how insurance policies are paid up after one's death,
how five-year plans call for the suspension of gratification in hopes
that greater gains will later ensue, and how religious concepts of the
afterlife influence human action now.25 He also knows through experimentation that strongly reinforced animals versus those weakly reinforced with regular personal gratification persist in working without
continuous rewards. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, Skinner argues
that ultimate sensitivity to the remote consequences of cultural survival is something that simply happens or will happen in the cultures
that survive. This is exceedingly close to his saying circuitously that
cultural survival is a self-evident truth for those chosen ones destined
to survive. 26
Skinner comes close to defining his implicit metaethics in a rather
offhand assertion that there "is a kind of natural morality in both
biological and cultural evolution." 27 For Skinner that is precisely the
case. "Good" is defined ultimately as equal in meaning to those
dynamics of evolution which are responsible for human progress. In
ethical parlance, Skinner's metaethics is that of nature-based absolutism. Inherent good is identified with processes intrinsic to nature.
Nevertheless, Skinner's highest norm of human survival, coupled with
his attributing moral significance to the psychological processes
behind evolution, allows him to select with great care which things
from nature are good, better, and best. His metaethical principles keep
him from identifying "good" with a single definition of "Nature's
way," such as the norm "survival of the fittest" for numerous Social
Darwinians. Yet, he still attributes ultimate value to natural processes.
He would not agree with the counsel of T. H. Huxley that "the ethical
progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still
less in running away from it, but in combating it. "28
Even as Skinner is not a relativist, so also he is not a noncognitivist.
Here again the ethical beliefs which Skinner theoretically abstracts
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from his psychological theory contradict those fundamental beliefs
which underlie his analysis. For example, in our discussion above concerning Skinner's absolutism, it is clear that his highest definition of
good - namely human sensitivity to the ultimate evolutionary consequences of their behavior - is based on cognition, not on any current,
noncognitive reinforcers. 29 Humans cannot, of course, be reinforced
by their eventual extinction. They can only deduce, perceive, or
imagine it is possible. The ultimate sensitivity to the remote consequences of cultural survival is clearly a cognitive, perceptual category,
and the crediting of this sensitivity with ultimate ethical good is something that Skinner has deduced from a complex, intellectual analysis
of biological, psychological, historical, and philosophical information.30
2. Normative Ethics
Distinguishing Skinner's theoretical noncognitive relativism from his
actual cognitive absolutism makes it possible for us clearly to understand and explicate his normative ethical statements from an otherwise bewildering array of "shoulds" and "oughts." His normative
ethical statements represent positions which include hedonism, altruism, egalitarianism, rule-keeping, and tolerant relativism. Our challenge
is to understand and display accurately and critically Skinner's ethical
priorities, and thus to build a foundation for showing why Skinner
proposes certain policies with regard to the treatment of retarded
persons and others.
Skinner's normative ethics reflect precisely the hierarchical ordering
of moral "goods" displayed in his metaethical principles. He regards
personal reinforcements as good, and hence talks at times in hedonistic terms. He says that he has enjoyed the pleasures of an "hedonistic
ethic," and further asserts that in order for a culture to gain the
"support of its members," it ought to "provide for pursuit and
achievement of happiness. "31 Nevertheless, the thrust of Skinner's
ethics opposes the maximization of personal pleasure. As he says in
several contexts, including his statement on retardation, personal reinforcements alone have as their consequence the production "at best
[of] only a 'feral' child" who is unable to compete strongly in the
evolutionary process. In defense of this point of view, Skinner initiates
a caustic critique of satiated, pleasure-gratifying hedonism, which he regards not as productive of useful, effective behavior, but rather as responsible for the environmental crisis and for many of the world's S9cial
pro blems. 32 It is little wonder that Skinner proposes that retarded persons ought not to be surrounded with leisure and gratification.
Behavior which contributes to the common good is better, because,
as noted above, it furthers evolutionary success and survival. All
humans - gifted, normal, retarded - ought, therefore, to seek to maximize what is socially reinforcing: to engage in efficient and productive labor, to contribute to socially-useful knowledge and technical
May, 1978
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skills, to abide by rules and laws which reinforce the control of the
social fabric, to develop greater self-management, to cease using
punishment, and to promote a certain degree of justice. 33 The last
two of these norms deserve special attention.
Skinner argues that humans ought not to punish each other, not
because it is inherently wrong on cognitive or emotional grounds
(which he regards as byproducts of human behavior), but because
punishment does not produce efficient, useful behavior. Unlike positive and negative reinforcements, punishment, rather than encouraging
or releasing "more reinforcing activities," decreases response, producing excessive timidity, anxiety, and a lack of adventurousness. 34 It is
also inefficient in that the punisher has to be present continually in
order to effect behavioral change.
Behind this critique of punishment is not deontological moral outrage, but the utilitarian principle that punishment does not produce
the best consequences. And for Skinner, the norm for assessing these
consequences is not maximized happiness, but maximized behavior
which will most likely lead to evolutionary progress and survival. Punishment discourages this type of behavior. It is therefore inherently
bad in Skinner's naturalistic schema which values evolutionary progress as ultimately or inherently right.
The role of some notion of justice in Skinnerean thought deserves
further investigation. His conception of a utopian social community
contains a degree of social and economic egalitarianism which exceeds
that of contemporary democratic or socialist societies. A society in
which menial labor is to be rewarded handsomely and professionallyenjoyable tasks much less reinforced is surely "more humanistic" than
some of Skinner's critics have allowed.35 Skinner furthermore praises
"a democracy" in which the "controller of culture" places himself
among the controlled. Yet he also senses that behavioral engineering
does not logically and naturally need to proceed along democratic
lines.36 It may well be asked whether Skinner's egalitarian norm is
logically grounded in his moral thought or whether in fact his form of
egalitarianism seems "just." 37
What Humans Should Do
Behavior which is predicated on a concern for cultural survival is
best. So what ought humans to do? They ought to act, to work, to
design, to make things and change things creatively, regularly, efficiently. They ought to behave like scientists who are not constantly
reinforced by personal gratification, but are reinforced sparingly by
incremental rewards and motivated by the remote consequences of
cultural survival. 38
In the context of talking about behavioral engineering, Skinner's
ultimate normative ethical standard is most clearly seen. We must
design a "better world," that is, one which is in keeping with the
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dynamics of evolutionary progress. Its "wonderful possibilities" include the following: motivation via positive reinforcements, not adversive, punishing ones; human willingness to become self-controlled for
the sake of the common good; diverse and new yet carefully planned
forms of art, music, literature, and even religion; and inventive concern for new technologies which further human survival possibilities.
Only in these ways will humans continue literally to shape their own
destinies in accord with past evolutionary progress. 39
B. F. Skinner's highest set of "oughts" have altruistic connotations.
The "designer of culture" is not to act primarily for his own immediate good, nor for those of his friends and contemporaries, but for
the good of those yet to be born. Although he may enjoy certain
hedonistic pleasures and receive degrees of gratitude or reinforcement
from his human contemporaries, he works vicariously. Yet in the final
analysis, he cannot be credited with a "more finely developed ethical
sense," for he ultimately reflects only the environment which molded
him. 40
It is now evident how Skinner's normative ethics, like his metaethics, is based on a norm selected from the natural order. We ought
to act in ways which are in keeping with the laws of nature, but not in
the same accidental and inefficient way that this process has unfolded
in the past. Skinner is not simply a Social Darwinist like Herbert
Spencer, for Skinner opposes forms of Social Darwinism or developmentalism which encourage humans "to stand around and wait." 41
He will countenance no resignation to the cosmic process.
In technical ethical categories, Skinner emerges as an eccentric,
pluralistic-rule utilitarian. His normative ethical judgments are constantly made on the basis of maximized consequences. And although
he clearly esteems a plurality of "goods," his ultimate principle of
cultural survival becomes a norm or rule by which all other "goods"
are evaluated.

3. The Treatment of Retarded Persons
Now that the distinction between B. F. Skinner's theoretical noncognitive relativism and actual cognitive, nature-based absolutism is
exhibited, we have a clear conceptual foundation for understanding
his policy proposals and ethical evaluations. We shall use his proposals
regarding the treatment of retarded persons as a case in point.
Skinner argues, with respect to institutions for the retarded, that
reform efforts based on the premise that moralistic feelings and moral
codes are substantial and influential are bound to fail. Such reforms
are both ineffective and misleading. They are ineffective because
ethics reflect environmental contingencies rather than shape or reform
them. If institutional environments are arranged so that reform-producing counter controls (or reinforcing contingencies) directly affect
those who work in them, then what is considered ethically responsible
May, 1978
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behavior will automatically ensue. If effective counter controls are
absent, no amount of moralism or reform-oriented procedures will
suffice.
These reforms are misleading because without a knowledge of
behavioral psychology, reformers confuse what is reinforcing to themselves with what may be reinforcing to retarded persons. Moral
reformers who are following such highly-valued maxims as the Golden
Rule of Christianity ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you") or Marxism's social maxim ("To each according to his need"),
find leisure and relaxation reinforcing. But these are not truly reinforcing for retarded persons. 42 What they need are not the "weak"
reinforcers of leisure, gratification, and consumption, but "some powerful reinforcers by which the human species evolved and survived. "43
At this point, Skinner's nature-based absolutism surfaces with great
force. He is not content for retarded persons to be treated in any
number of ways relative to numerous types of environments. They
should not live hedonistic lives. Those who work with them should
not follow the moral maxims of Christian or Marxist reciprocity. The
retarded must be controlled by the "strong" reinforcements which
have and will enable the human species to triumph in the evolutionary
process. An example of a strong reinforcement is that of eating. If the
retarded are given food only if they behave in certain ways, they will
soon learn to "behave productively," that is, behave in ways that
contribute "to the continuing evolution ... of culture. "44 The behavior of the retarded is "good" if it conforms with the behavior which
has enabled the human species to evolve to its present status. The
"good life" for retarded humans is not comprised of leisure and gratification, but of social skills, greater personal independence, and
accomplishments in art, sports, and science. 45
So how should our institutional policies regarding the control of the
retarded be formed? They should be formed not by moral feeling or
caring, nor by the consensus which emerges from the clashing opinions
of self-interest groups, as depicted, for example, in the ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr. Policies regarding retarded persons should be set by
behavior scientists who recognize the ultimate "importance of productive labor for the strength of the culture" and who "can take the
remote consequences of the environment into account. "46 That is, in
the light of the ultimate consequence that the human species may not
survive, behavioral psychologists know that humans ought most of all
to be productive, to invent, and to contribute to culture so that
annihilation will not occur; and they will design human environments
accordingly. There is hardly a better example of the influence of B. F.
Skinner's ethics on his policy proposals than on this point. Policies
regarding the retarded must conform to natural evolution and must be
constantly informed by the ultimate consequences resulting from
human behavior. They must, that is, conform to Skinner's form of
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nature-based, rule utilitarianism.
Skinner asks at one point whether it is ethical to do research on
psychotics and the retarded without their consent. His answer is yes.
It is for their "ultimate good" that such research is done; and it is
through this research that they will be able to "make a real contribution" to a world in which others like themselves will live. 4 7 His justification for experimentation without consent is grounded in consequentialism. The ultimate consequences of such experimentation for
the good of the world outweigh any moral qualms against inducing or
forcing them "to participate as subjects of research." 48
In dealing fairly with Skinner's proposals, we should refer briefly to
the kinds of controls that he advocates for the purposes of changing
humans. He does not wish these controls to be inhuman or dictatorial,
and perhaps only time will unravel the ultimate consequences of Skinner's own proposals. Normal humans, argues Skinner, should not be
changed in harmful or punishing ways against their wills. (Skinner, of
course, would not use the term "will.") Skinner furthermore believes
that change is to occur in piecemeal fashion, primarily as people are
won over to, not forced to accept, the virtues of his plan. As we have
just seen, however, he does not believe that retarded persons and
psychotics need to be "won over" or convinced before experimentation can be done on them. Nor should the new order be uniform and
unchanging - although diversity and change ought to be carefully
planned and monitored. 49 Finally, rather than having the characteristics of an unnatural, uncanny order, Skinner's "I:>~tter world" theoretically is continuous with natural evolutionary processes. 50
The mechanism for effecting change is the use of extensive controls,
and "control" has positive connotations for Skinner. He asserts that
the "intentional design of a culture and the control it implies are
essential if the human species is to continue to develop." 51 He thus
justifies the use of control by his highest ethical norm of human
progress and survival. He supports this emphasis on control with two
other points. Since environments determine behavior anyway, it
makes more sense to use identifiable, rationalized norms of control. 52 And given the present social-environmental crisis, it is now
necessary to hasten the pace of cultural evolution. This cannot be
accomplished without control.
4. Critique
Before focusing on selected problems in Skinner's ethics generally
and his proposals regarding retarded persons specifically, I should
emphasize that certain of his ideas regarding the treatment of severely
retarded humans appear to me to deserve serious, if not enthusiastic,
consideration. Operant behaviorism appears to make truly significant
contributions to our understanding of human and animal beh!lvior,
and hence should be utilized toward moral ends. The criticisms offered
May, 1978
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in this essay are thus to be construed as pointing to the problematic
moral character of certain of Skinner's ethical opinions as well as to
the problematic claims of omniscience made on behalf of thoroughgoing, deterministic behaviorism.
Furthermore, certain of Skinner's proposals, quite apart from his
own ethical positions, hold promise for the development and wellbeing of many severely handicapped, retarded persons. For example,
Skinner's highlighting of the need to distinguish between what reinforces retarded humans and what reinforces humans with normal or
above normal abilities can be utilized as a valuable procedural insight
for the influencing and motivating of the retarded, even as it is for the
maturation and rearing of children. The question then becomes,
"influence and motivate to do what for which reasons?" This places us
squarely in the middle of normative ethics, and it is at this point that
the norms of justice, gratitude, and so on, call into question the
granting of ultimate value to the norm of evolutionary survival, as will
be developed shortly.
Operant behaviorism can even be regarded as compatible with the
kind of justice or reciprocity set forth in the Golden Rule. In his essay
on the retarded, Skinner suggests that this rule conflicts with operant
behaviorism because it means that we are to reinforce others with the
same things that reinforced us. Skinner argues that those who follow
the Golden Rule will thus seek to provide retarded persons with too
much leisure and gratification. However, the reciprocity of this rule
may just as adequately emphasize that we are to allow others to be
reinforced to the degree that we wish to be reinforced. Reciprocity
thus means that we are to share work and responsibility even as we are
to share justly health, gratification, and personal fulfillment. Operant
behaviorism is thus not a method which can be used only in conjunction with Skinnerean utilitarianism.
Three problem areas regarding Skinner's ethics and proposals call
for particular attention. First, and genuinely problematic, is Skinner's
lack of specificity concerning who are the psychotics and retarded
persons about whom he is speaking. To be sure, vegetating human
organisms and severely retarded individuals have been led to develop
certain basic human skills through behavior modification. 53 Nevertheless, the great majority of retarded humans fall into an IQ range of
from 50- 70; and many of these individuals, once freed from the
stereotypes of many public school contexts, seem to lead "normal"
lives as housewives, blue-collar workers, small farmers, and so
on. 54 Without question, moral problems are raised with respect to
their bearing children and their social roles in society, but surely any
wholesale dismissal of their right to consent to experimentation is
replete with social and moral difficulties.
This criticism is supplemented by a second set of criticisms associated with Skinner's form of rule utilitarianism. Two of the crucial
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problems for any utilitarian or teleological ethical position are those
involving victimization and the sanctioning of "heinous crimes." Hedonistic utilitarians have been greatly criticized on these grounds. If the
right act is that which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest
number, innocent persons can be victimized. On similar grounds,
shocking crimes, such as the classic example of giving a poisoned piece
of candy to a child, might not be prohibited. Surely the prima facie
horror that such a crime evokes is at least greatly diminished when the
morality of this act is assessed by its ultimate consequences. Rule
utilitarianism developed precisely as an attempt to meet these kinds of
objections to purely consequentialist reasoning.
Problematic Utilitarianism
Now if teleological reasoning poses problems for utilitarianism generally, as I believe it does, the kind of utilitarianism espoused by
Skinner seems exceedingly problematic. Skinner's ethics gives the
highest value to the remotest consequences of human behavior and has
as a rule the principle of the survival of the species, not the individual.
Skinner's form of rule utilitarianism thus intensifies, rather than eases,
the ethical problems of ordinary utilitarianism.
Why, on grounds of the survival of the species, should the weak, the
infirm, the retarded, the psychotic, or even the less intelligent or less
virile be protected, or even preserved? And if evolutionary progress is
due to increasing animal sensitivity to the consequences of behavior,
as it is for Skinner, it would logically follow that retarded persons or
everyone with sub-normal or perhaps not terribly high intellects could
be regarded as distinct liabilities to social progress. On Skinnerean
grounds, how would their presence be justified? One possible justification would be that they could contribute to human evolution by
becoming the subjects of experimental research. This point, unfortunately, has not been lost on Skinner or other operant behaviorists. 55
We have seen that in his essay on the retarded, Skinner has little
concern for the consent of the retarded or mentally-ill individual. His
survival-oriented, consequentialist reasoning leads to a disregard of
their "rights."
Skinner's consequentialist ethics raises further problems with
respect to the protection, or lack of it, of normally intelligent and
healthy individuals. This is true because Skinner's thought has no set
of safeguards for the individual parallel to that of normative ethical
theories that stress individual rights, the treatment of individuals only
as ends in themselves, or a set of prima facie moral norms in which
agreements and obligations are implicitly valued. In Skinner's thought
the individual is jeopardized in a number of ways. Determinism says
that he or she has no inherent personal uniqueness. Evolutionary consequentialism says that he or she has "only a minor bearing on the
survival of the culture," and therefore is given a largely inconsequenMay, 1978
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tial status. 56 And Skinner's great emphasis on control raises far-reaching questions about the nature and extent of individual deviance
which might be considered acceptable to the group.
The problem of individual deviance becomes acute when the new
social order presumably exercises social control only by positive reinforcements, not by negative prohibitions or punishments. This new
social order might at first sight be considered humane, but it becomes
questionably virtuous upon closer scrutiny. Through its system of
positive reinforcements, the society would define what is "good" and
expect or assume that individuals would live by or reflect the good.
Those who would attempt to live by some other set of "goods" would
be breaking the norms of the society and would likely be looked upon
as threats to the survival and progress of the society. This system in
which "maximized good" equals "maximized control by positive reinforcements" contrasts dramatically with present societies which control human behavior primarily by prohibiting forms of harm, thus
allowing multiple definitions of "good" to flourish.
Assume, for example, that a Huckleberry Finn was born into an
ideal Skinnerean society. Huck is a prankster, a wanderer, a flaunter of
social proprieties, an exposer of social pretensions, and above all, a
lover of idleness and a passionate hater of work. Mark Twain well
knew that Huck Finn with all of his resistance to civilization was an
affront to a rule-keeping, hard-working, Puritan social order. To that
order Huck was a problem, not because he broke laws, but because he
lived by hi~ own definition of goodness.
Presumably in a society controlled by positive reinforcements,
Huck Finn would be re-reinforced so that the "automatic goodness"
which Skinner admires would be forthcoming. 57 If this did not work,
theoretically he would not be punished or called "bad," but he might
well be treated as insane. 58
An objection to this depiction of the problem of individuality in an
operant society might be that such deviations as Huck Finnism would
never occur in an effectively reinforcing situation where individual
freedom and autonomy were recognized as pre-scientific chimeras. But
this objection is based on the utopian notion that operant behaviorism
would be literally perfected and on the philosophical-scientific
assumption that the human mind has only the uni-dimensional capacities which Skinner attributes to it.
Third, we should recall again the problem which has been highlighted as the virtual leitmotif of this essay, namely the contradiction
between Skinner's theoretical noncognitivist relativism and his actual
conceptual absolutism. Readers of Skinner's works are easily confused
by his discussions and proposals because Skinner the ethicist is often
hidden behind Skinner the psychologist. Skinner the psychologist is
saying that ethics count for very little in the arena of human behavior,
while in fact ethical issues are playing exceedingly important roles in
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Skinner's thought. Equally problematic is the confusion not of the
reader, but of Skinner, the writer. Skinner, I am afraid, does not
understand himself as someone who holds to an ethical position which
can be scrutinized and criticized, but as someone who sets forth an
objective, empirical, scientific point of view. On the basis of such
self-delusion, ethical responsibility can be set aside and harm can be
perpetuated in the name of science.
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